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Community
It is appropriate that the publication 
supporting the International Data Farming 
Workshop is named after a farming 
implement. In farming, a scythe is used to 
clear and harvest. We hope that the 
“Scythe” will perform a similar role for 
our data farming community by being a 
tool to help prepare for our data farming 
efforts and harvest the results. The Scythe 
is provided to all attendees of the 
Workshops. Electronic copies may be 
obtained from harvest.nps.edu. Please 
contact the editors for additional paper 
copies.
The Scythe consists primarily of team 
reports written by the team members on 
activity, analysis, and results in their team 
during the workshop from their 
perspective. Please let us know what you 
think of this ninth prototypical issue. 
Articles, ideas for articles and material, 
and any commentary are always 
appreciated.
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Overview
The International Data Farming Community is a 
consortium of researchers interested in the study of Data 
Farming, its methodologies, applications, tools, and 
evolution.
The primary venue for the Community is the biannual 
International Data Farming Workshops, where 
researchers participate in team-oriented model 
development, experimental design, and analysis using 
high performance computing resources... that is, Data 
Farming. 
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IDFW 21:
“EXPLORATION”
by Gary Horne 
Naval Postgraduate School 
International Data Farming Workshop. Number 21 was held in Lisbon from September 19th through 
24th, 2010.  This workshop was the first we have held in Portugal and it was a magnficent treat to be 
there!  Our theme was “Exploration” as might be expected with Portugal being the home of many great 
explorers in our history and the starting point for many great adventures.  We had eight teams and our 
goal during the week was, as usual, to work in these teams using data farming methods to explore our 
important questions.  
On behalf of our host, Colonel Fernando Freire from the Portuguese Military Academy, I would like to 
express our thanks to the team leaders, the plenary speakers, and all of the participants in IDFW 21!  And, 
of course, a large Thank You to Fernando and all of the folks from Portugal who worked so hard to make 
IDFW 21 a world-class event!
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September 2010 — Lisbon, Portugal
International Data Farming Workshop 21
This issue, our ninth, of The Scythe contains a summary of each work team effort.  And, as always, the 
other materials from this workshop are available online at http://harvest.nps.edu along with electronic 
copies of this issue of The Scythe.  The plan continues to be to hold even-numbered workshops once a 
year in Monterey with odd-numbered workshops taking place at international venues.  So looking ahead, 
our Data Farming community will be in Monterey from the 20th through the-25th of March 2011for our 
next workshop, International Data Farming Workshop 22. And for those of you who like to plan a little 
more in advance, International Data Farming Workshop 23 will be held in Finland from the 18th through 
the-23rd of  September 2011.  We hope to see you at both!
Gary Horne
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Team 1: Analyzing Forecasted Pirate 
Probabilities to Exploit Meteorological and 
Intelligence Parameters Through Data Farming
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Naval Postgraduate School, US 
INTRODUCTION
In the course of recent history, the instability and lack of 
government in Somalia have caused a rapid increase in 
pirate activity within the Somali Basin Region (SBR) and the 
Gulf of Aden (GoA).  The United States and multi-national 
military forces, combining the U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command (USNAVCENT), U.S. Fifth Fleet and units from 
over 20 international partners under the leadership of Vice 
Admiral William Gortney, has been tasked with finding a 
solution to deter and eliminate pirating within the GoA and 
SBR.
Piracy may seem to be a very simple opportunistic form 
of robbery, but when the top layer is removed a more 
complicated and intricate problem is revealed.  The Combined 
Maritime Forces (CMF) Assessment Team and Maritime 
Security Operations (MSO) are actively pursuing ways to 
mitigate pirating of neutral vessels.  Neutral vessels can be 
defined as shipping vessels, commercial tankers, sailing 
vessels, fishing vessels, and yachts.  The CMF team and MSO 
shop are working together to patrol the 2.5 million square 
miles of vulnerable waters between the coast of Somalia and 
India.  Due to the large ransoms being gained by pirating 
neutral vessels, piracy has spread across the globe and 
particularly to the western side of Africa in the Gulf of 
Guinea, U.S. Seventh Fleet operating waters.  
For these reasons and more, the Big Three:  the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union 
(EU), and the United States (US), are actively seeking 
additional tools to help strategically place their military 
ships.  This tool should be able to predict at what date time 
group (DTG) and at what location (longitude/latitude) the 
probability of a pirate attack is high.  Having this vital 
information will enable the Big Three to provide each military 
vessel’s Commanding Officer a better chance to interdict a 
Pirate Action Group (PAG) before an attack occurs or patrol 
and deter  piracy in a location that has a high probability of a 
pirate attack.  A PAG is a group of pirate skiffs that attach to a 
mother skiff for operational longevity.   
A pirate prediction tool may save NATO, EU, and US 
military forces time, money, and resources.  The Next 
Generation Piracy Performance Surface Model (PPS-Next) is a 
predictive tool developed by Dr James Hansen, Naval 
Research Laboratory-Monterey, in partnership with the Naval 
Meteorology and Oceanography Command (NMOC) at 
Stennis Space Center and the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Operations Research (OR) Department.  PPS-Next 
dynamically couples pirate Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS), defined by intelligence (INTEL) gained on pirate 
activity, with meteorological activity (METOC), such as 
waves, winds, drift, and currents, to forecast relative risk of 
pirate activity at a given DTG, latitude and longitude.
Simulated Pirate Behavior
The new version of PPS-Next, updated since the analysis 
from IDFW-20, is very different in the simulation of pirate 
behavior.  In IDFW-20, the simulated pirate motored to a 
waypoint and then drifted with the current.  The simulated 
pirate would complete a pre-determined mission length, and 
then transit back to its origin (Esher et al, 2010).  
Advancements have been made to PPS-Next to increase 
the operational usefulness of the model for CMF Assessment 
Team, NATO partners, and commercial shipping companies. 
This model provides the operator with the ability to map 
PAGs’ proposed area of operations to Google earth with the 
addition of real METOC conditions, while giving the pirates 
certain behaviors (defined in Table 1) that will impact the way 
the PAGs move from their base waypoint distribution to their 
operating waypoint distribution.  
Determining the most influential independent variables 
will allow the developers to set parameters to reduce run time 
and capture the driving factors and help operators to 
concentrate their intelligence efforts on these important areas. 
If METOC conditions prove to be the driving factors, then 
particular attention should be given to monitoring military 
operational attributes in correlation to METOC.  
Design of PPS-Next Experiment
To capture the effects of all variables and interactions among 
them, we used a  Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) design (Cioppa & Lucas, 2007; Cioppa, 2002), with 
four rotational designs.
Table 1 lists the independent variables that were varied in 
the simulation and their corresponding minimum and 
maximum values.  For many of the independent variables, 
their standard deviations (StDev) were also varied. For the 
StDevs, we elected to make their minimum and maximum 
values a proportion of the mean values of the underlying 
parameter.  
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A brief description of each of the independent variables is 
as follows:  mission length is the mean length of time that a 
PAG is active in the simulation; the number of bases is the 
total number of sea or land bases that pirates operate from; 
pirate skiff speed is the mean speed that a  PAG is expected to 
sustain during the transit and searching patterns [this does 
not include attacking speed]; mean drift current is the factor 
by which the velocity of the currents impacts the velocity of 
the skiff; mean drift wind is the factor by which the velocity of 
the winds affects skiff velocity; mean wind threshold is the 
mean wind threshold below which a PAG can operate; mean 
wave threshold is the mean wave threshold below which a 
PAG can operate; minimum (maximum) iweather is the 
minimum (maximum) probability that a PAG has knowledge 
of adverse weather conditions before the PAG leaves their 
starting waypoint, in the event the PAG does not know about 
weather conditions and encounters adverse weather their 
mission will be terminated; pirate search pattern is equal to 0 
if the PAG has a drifting search, 1 if the PAG has a random 
walk, and 2 if the PAG has a zigzag search pattern; number of 
tracks is the number of PAGs replicated during a 24 hour 
simulation time step period; model time step is the 
incremental time-steps the code uses, which affects run time, 
but can cause simulation instability if a poor value is chosen; 
pirate hits is either a 0 if no hits occurred or a 1  if a pirate hit 
occurred [the pirate hit would be an observed attack that 
occurred in a simulated area and the probabilities would be 
updated based on the simulated probabilities and the actual 
hit (successful/attempt/unsuccessful/etc).   
1. The first column is a  list of the independent 
variables that will be modeled in the simulation.
2. The second column is the mathematical description 
of the numbers to delineate between continuous 
and integer numbers.    
This team faced many challenge but the most challenging 
was translating our design of experiment (DOE) into the input 
format that the PPS-Next code requires.  PPS-Next is written 
in Python (x,y) 2.6.5.3 and we were running the code in 
Python (x,y) 2.6.6.0; version control was extremely important. 
When the code ran to completion with the DOE, the 
probability field outputs then need to be transferred to 
MATLAB for mathematical comparison and inputted into 
JMP 9.0 for statistical analysis.  
Figure 1: Sample output from the PPS-Next base-case 
scenario.  The plot shows the simulated distribution of 
pirate action groups within the Somali Basin Region.  The 
darker red colors are indicative of a higher probability of a 
pirate being in this latitude and longitude areas of low 
probability are dark blue.  
Description of Scenario
PPS-Next is a framework that generates Monte-Carlo 
simulations of pirate behavior and interprets these results 
probabilistically.  Simulations are affected by five key 
distributions:  real-time meteorological and oceanographic 
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Independent 







Number of Bases Integer 10.0 30.0
Pirate Skiff Speed 
(knots)
Integer 3.0 10.0









Mean Drift Wind 
(knots)
Continuous 0.0 0.5



























variable, 0, 1, or 2)
Categorical 
(Nominal) 0 2
Number of Tracks Integer 128 128








Table 1: Independent variables with their corresponding minimum 
and maximum values used in the Cioppa & Lucas Nearly 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube design that was downloaded from the 
SEED Center website.
forecasts, information about the impact of meteorological and 
oceanographic conditions on a PAG (skiff and/or mother 
dhow), information about the distributions of locations and 
times from which the PAG begins their missions, information 
about the length of time and distribution of locations in 
which a PAG can operate, and known (unknown) intelligence 
about the PAG’s CONOPS for targeting neutral vessels (i.e. 
commercial shipping, sailing vessel, yacht, fishing vessel, 
chemical tanker).  Individual PAG replicates are given 
attributes that are randomly drawn from the key distributions 
before executing a mission.  Due to limited INTEL on PAG 
operating areas a large numbers of replicates are run daily 
and this output is then archived.  The resulting collections of 
PAG trajectories are used to define PAG densities as a 
function of forecast lead.  PAG attack probabilities are 
obtained by convolving the results with commercial shipping 
densities and additional meteorological and oceanographic 
constraints.
Figure 2 shows the normalized pirate probabilities over a 
48-hour period.  This figure is a 3-D replication of the plot in 
Figure 1 with the land masses not represented.
Figure 2: Normalized by summing over the pirate probabilities for 
the simulated period of 12 hours through 60 hours.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The greatest challenge for this Team was creating a link 
between the world of Data Farming and the simulation, PPS-
Next.  This complexity led to slow progress while attempting 
to conduct simulation runs with the independent variables 
from Table 1 in a four rotational design of the NOLH.  PPS-
Next was initially designed to run on the high performance 
computers at the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVO) in 
Mississippi with the ability to be used at the CMF 
Headquarters in Bahrain and eventually extending its 
capabilities to commercial shipping companies.  Prior to 
IDFW-21, PPS-Next had only been tested on a single base-
case scenario; therefore, the combinations of input 
parameters generated as part of the space-filling NOLH 
design in many cases created errors that PPS-Next could not 
recover from. In operational usage, users will have the 
ability to modify many of the variables – such as waypoint 
distributions. Therefore, by pushing the limits of the model 
we allowed the developer to modify the code to make it 
more resistant to problematic input combinations. Despite 
simulation runs not being completed during the duration of 
IDFW 21, the missing link to the puzzle was solved after the 
workshop and simulation runs from this NOLH design were 
completed.  
During IDFW 20, we examined different ways to measure 
the output, and used nine output metrics as shown in the 
table below (Esher et al., 2010), and these were used to analyze 
IDFW 21 results. 
Dependent Variable






Inner Smoothed Maximum Difference
Mean 50th Percentile
Smoothed Mean 50th Percentile
Table 2: Output Metrics
There is no clear-cut best way to summarize the quality 
or variations in PPS-Next output. During IDFW 21, the team 
discussed new ways to measure the simulation output. We 
explored smoothing the PPS-next output, which is very 
narrowly distributed to find the “sweet spot” where the 
output is being accurately measured without losing any of its 
validity.  
We received historical pirate data from the Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL) at Stennis Space Center along the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast.  The data was read into JMP 8.0, 
statistical analysis software, to explore commonality amongst 
historical pirate attacks.  The data received had many 
pertinent areas that were not accounted for or data was 
unavailable; for this reason, we decided that there were not 
enough data points to accurately conclude a proper analysis 
through common trends and trend lines, regression/partition 
trees, or generalized/linear models. 
We also highlighted areas of analytical discussion and 
approaches:
• We discussed the Validation, Verification, and 
Accreditation (VV&A) of PPS-Next.
• In future simulation runs, we looked to altering the 
time step (dt) in the NOLH to find the “sweet spot” 
that would provide the same accuracy and conciseness 
without the omission of important details.
• We discussed how and when we could compare PPS-
Next against historical attacks and historical METOC 
conditions.  This analysis is complicated because the 
real METOC conditions from historical attacks are not 
kept in a database.  
• For future analysis, we discussed looking at a  using 
not only a rotational design but also the advantages of 
using a robust design as defined by Taguchi with the 
use of indicator variables when analyzing PPS-Next.
• When attempting to run PPS-Next we came across 
some areas where the definitions for certain 
independent variables were not as clearly defined as 
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assumed; therefore, we discussed the disadvantages 
and precautionary measures for  using a model that 
has not been developed by anyone on the team.
• PPS-Next is written in Python (x,y) 2.6.5.3 and the 
code was very sensitive to the differing version of 
Python (x,y) that were used.  In operational use, this 
may cause extensive frustration for the operator of 
PPS-Next.  Caution should be used when using a 
computer language that is as fragile as Python (x,y) as 
this adds unnecessary loss of time and resources in 
code troubleshooting.
CONCLUSIONS
PPS-Next, the Next Generation Piracy Performance Surface 
Model, is being constructed to supersede the current Piracy 
Performance Surface model, PPS, for the US Military Fleet, 
NATO Militaries, and the European Union.  The product will 
be invaluable for use by the Combined Maritime Forces and 
Maritime Security Operations, headquartered in Bahrain, for 
allocation of military assets in offensive and defensive 
measures and also to provide commercial shipping 
companies with a forward warning tool.     
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade after the highly publicized small  boat 
attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V Limburg (in 
2002) in Yemen, small vessels continue to pose a security 
threat to ports worldwide. At ports, small vessels frequently 
operate in close proximity to important maritime 
infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants, and 
to passenger and military ships. (Department of Homeland 
Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy, 2008)
An attacker can be easily camouflaged among innocent 
small  vessel traffic and avoid detection by being in the crowd, 
all the while approaching its desired target undetected and 
unopposed. When the attacker finally decides to execute the 
attack, separating from the main traffic to speed toward its 
target, there is only a  narrow time window for an effective 
defender response.
Two factors confound the defense against such attacks. 
The first is the lack of warning, which leads to the inability of 
a defender to anticipate the true target of the attack from 
among the many possible targets and hence is unable to pre-
position any assets to protect the target. The second factor is 
that the effort to classify the malicious intention of a would-be 
attacker is non-trivial, since the attacker would look like an 
innocent vessel from afar. Conceivably, a further difficulty the 
defender would face is the restriction of maneuver space for 
an interception attempt in a shipping channel with high 
traffic, especially if the terrorist boat weaves in and out among 
the innocent vessels.
The objective of the study is to explore the effects of 
neutrals on the effectiveness of the defender’s deterrence and 
interdiction operations against a small boat attack in a port 
environment. The goal of the team was to identify robust 
employment tactics of port security forces to detect, defend 
and/or intercept a spectrum of threats and adversary tactics, 
through the use of MANA and a red-teaming process.
Scenario and Modeling
The Port of Lisbon was chosen for the study scenario. Lisbon 
is a wealthy and important city, with its busy port 
contributing significantly to commerce and trade. The city of 
Lisbon is also a key tourist icon 
in Portugal, being one of the 
oldest cities of the world, richly 
endowed with history dating 
from the Neolithic era, and is 
also home to two UNESCO 
World Heritage Sites – Belém 
Tower and Jerónimos 
Monastery (Wikipedia). The city 
and port present many potential 
targets for terrorists to strike 
from the sea and, together with 
the high volume of traffic in a 
narrow straits, poses a 
challenge for the navy and 
maritime police to defend.
A busy section of the Tagus 
River at Lisbon, of 
approximately 10 by 5 km, was 
modelled (see Figure 1). Initial 
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Figure 1: Port of Lisbon
runs with the terrain map crashed due to insufficient pixels, 
but this issue was overcome by increasing the pixel resolution. 
Three types of agents are modelled:
• Neutrals: Commercial and recreational shipping 
traffic (neutral vessels) ply the channel in the center of 
the straits.
• Attacker: The attacker is presumed to employ a 
speedboat in the 20-foot class, such as the Baja Outlaw 
20, and is capable of carrying 4 to 6 persons, or a few 
hundred pounds of explosives, at high speeds. The 
attacker seeks to be camouflaged among traffic, 
entering the region from the west, and joining the 
stream of neutral vessel traffic. 
One intention of the team was to model the attacker’s 
ability to randomly choose a target along the coast to 
attack. However, due to the complexity of modelling 
and calibrating the behaviour of the neutral vessels, 
which consumed most of the time at the workshop, 
this objective was set aside. Instead, the attacker was 
given just one target – the naval base on the east of the 
area of operations considered.
If the attacker boat is unopposed in its approach to the 
target, it will follow the shipping traffic until it reaches 
the shortest path to the target, at which point the 
attacker will speed up to maximum speed and execute 
a strike. This modus operandi simulates a high level of 
surprise that can be accorded to the attacker.
• Defender: The defending boats are assumed to be 
patrol boats equivalent to the SAFE Boat International 
Defender class boat, widely used by the US Coast 
Guard. They are tasked to perform random checks on 
vessels in the channel, and are either deployed in a 
barrier  patrol profile or to sweep the channel (see 
Figure 2).
Figure 2: Patrol Locations and Attacker’s Target
Agent Interactions
Each patrol boat selects a neutral vessel within its sensor 
range at random, proceeds toward it and stops the vessel for 
inspection. The inspection takes 5 minutes to complete, after 
which the vessel will  be tagged as a non-threatening vessel 
and will not be stopped if it later meets other patrol boats. 
During an inspection, the patrol boat will be unable to 
classify any other vessel in its sensor range. After an 
inspection, the patrol boat will travel for 5 minutes before 
looking for the next vessel to inspect, to avoid getting fixed in 
a single location. These two 5 minute gaps potentially allow 
for an attacker to sneak past the patrol boats.
On the other hand, if the patrol boat stops and inspects an 
attacker boat, the attacker will be known immediately, and the 
interception will be counted a success. If the attacker sees the 
patrol boat, it will speed up and attempt to outrun the 
defending patrol boat, and head for  its target. The patrol boat 
will give chase and attempt to stop the attacker. However, the 
attacker has a head-start that leads to an advantage in the 
chase (since the maximum speeds of both boats are the same).
Experiment Setup
The probability of at least 1 successful attack is used as the 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) in this study. A small 
experiment was designed to verify the model in the 
workshop, using the factor and level settings given in Table 
1. 
Factors Levels
Number of Neutrals 8 - 20
Number of Blue patrol boats 1 - 3
Number of Red attackers 1 - 3
Speed of Blue patrols Patrol speed: 10 - 30 kts (Max: 40 kts)
Evasive Speed of Red Attackers 40 kts (Fixed)
Sensor Range Det: 3000 - 6000 mClass: 200 - 1000 m
Table 1: Factors and Levels
The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube design of 
experiments spreadsheet was used to obtain 33 design points 
(NOLH spreadsheet, downloaded from harvest.nps.edu), and 
50 replications of each design point were run.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We anticipated the effects of the factors as follows:
Factor Proportion of Successful Attacks
More patrols Reduced
More attackers Increased
Longer sensor range Reduced
Speed of patrols Increased
More neutral shipping Increased
Table 2: Anticipated Factor Effects on the MOE
The simulation results were analyzed through a partition 
tree followed by a logistic fit (see Figure 3), yielding two 
unexpected findings. We found that the speed of patrols had 
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marginal effect on the proportion of 
successful attacks, and a surprise finding 
that more neutrals had resulted in a higher 
probability of detection. 
Scrutiny of the simulation showed 
that due to the higher volume of traffic, 
the patrol boats were spending more time 
in the centre of the channel. Since the route 
the attacker takes passes through the 
center of the channel, the chance of a 
patrol detecting the attacker was higher. 
We rationalized that this artifact was a 
model-specific issue.
Conclusion
Within the short span of the workshop, 
the team managed to assemble and verify 
a basic model for exploring the defense 
against small boat attacks in the complex 
environment of a port. This experiment 
opens the way for further study by 
detailing the scenario and providing the 
building blocks of agent behavior in a 
MANA model.
REFERENCES
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Figure 3: Partition Tree and Logistic FiT
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ELICIT (Experimental Laboratory for the Investigation of 
Collaboration, Information-sharing and Trust) is a research 
and experimentation program developed for the US DOD 
CCRP (Command and Control Research Program) to 
conduct research related with collaboration, information 
sharing and trust in organizations. The ELICIT platform is 
an experimentation environment supported by software 
tools and procedures that allows instantiating different C2 
approaches and observation of behaviors and dynamics in 
the information, cognitive and social domains. Agent-based 
ELICIT (abELICIT) is the agent-based functionality of the 
ELICIT platform, and allows a researcher to conduct human-
only, agent-only or hybrid human and agent experiments. 
The version used in this workshop was version 2.4; we 
focused on running experiments using software agents only. 
To explore the vast input space of the abELICIT model 
and understand how changes in the input variables affect 
various output metrics, e.g., how shared awareness affects 
agility of a  C2 approach, the CCRP ELICIT team and the 
international ELICIT CoI (Community of Interest) will benefit 
from an automated data farming capability within the ELICIT 
platform. Toward that end, the abELICIT data farming team 
first conducted an experiment aimed at understanding the 
ordering effects of “factoids”, i.e., when specific information 
reaches agents, and how that might impact several metrics of 
interest. Additionally, we were interested in observing how 
ordering of the factoids makes a difference while agent 
parameters are systematically varied, as well as looking at 
different kinds of ordering, based on the types and impacts of 
the factoids.
Initially, our goals during the workshop were to continue 
analysis of the initial experiment, identify a set of possible 
next steps, to learn and understand a little more of what 
abELICIT is and how it is used by the ELICIT CoI, and where 
our work can positively impact the community. We set aside 
the original goal of continuing the analysis of the initial 
experiment and instead set an additional goal  to conduct a 
simple exploratory data farming experiment using abELICIT. 
This would allow us to demonstrate proof-of-concept and to 
get a feel for the necessary mechanics in setting up and 
conducting a data farming experiment with abELICIT, as well 
as continuing to learn more about abELICIT functionality. 
We next give an overview of abELICIT functionality. 
Following that is a description of our data  farming 
experiment, a note on the illustrative results and analysis, and 
a summary concludes the paper.
abELICIT Overview
Within an abELICIT experiment (also applies to an ELICIT 
experiment), the problem the agents need to solve is 
collectively determining the where, what, when, and who of 
a future, fictitious terrorist attack. Information on this attack 
is contained in a  set of “factoids”, with each factoid 
containing information relevant to one aspect of the attack. 
To whom and when the factoids are distributed to the agents 
is a function of the individual experiment. The agents then 
process the factoids received to determine, among other 
things, whether to share that information with other agents 
it is connected to, or to post or pull factoids from a notional 
website dedicated to a particular aspect of the problem. For 
abELICIT, whether and when the agents have solved the 
problem is determined by processing the log files after the 
run is completed. 
Software agents may be parameterized according to 54 
parameters that determine, among other aspects, the way they 
process information, build awareness, socialize and identify, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. Whether to share, how often to 
share, and the likelihood to seek information are all examples 
of agent parameters that can be varied. A number of 
parameters are associated with the amount of time a 
particular action takes, e.g., how long it takes to share or post 
a factoid once the agent determines it will share or post. 
Finally, there are a few Boolean (on/off, true/false) 
parameters such as whether the agent is a guesser or a 
hoarder of factoids. 
Figure 1: Parameterizing Agent Characteristics
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For more detailed information about abELICIT, refer to 
(Ruddy 2009, Ruddy 2010).
Experiments
To gain familiarity with abELICIT, help design our initial 
experiment, and determine a small subset of the parameters 
to focus on, the team went through each of the 54 agent 
parameters, categorized them into the four broad categories 
depicted in Figure 1, and then prioritized them according to 
how we thought they may impact performance. We decided 
to focus on 7 parameters to characterize two types of agent 
behaviors, and used those in conjunction the two available 
organizational structures of HIERARCHY and EDGE 
(provided as examples on the ELICIT server). These 7 
parameters were: postedTypes, sharedTypes, 
propensityToShare, shareWith, shareWithWebSites, 
propensityToSeek, and primary area of interest (more details 
on all the parameters can be found in Ruddy 2010).
The experiments were designed to test performance of (a) 
Traditional HIERARCHY and (b) EDGE organizations when 
their constituent members are either: (i) TYPE 1: highly 
specialized (task focused), share/post sporadically and strictly 
within hierarchical chain; or (ii) TYPE-2: flexible across tasks, 
share/post, share/post often and across all members. (More 
information on differing C2 approaches and Hierarchy and 
Edge organizations can be found in, e.g., Alberts 2003 and 
Alberts 2006).  
The four possible combinations of two organizational 
structures (HIERARCHY and EDGE) with two agent 
behaviors (TYPE 1 and TYPE 2) resulted in the 2x2 design of 
experiments matrix presented in Table 1.  Hierarchy 1 (H-1) 
and Edge 1  (E-1) are the “usual” Hierarchy and Edge 
organizational structures, with Hierarchy 2 (H-2) and Edge 2 
(E-2) being hybrid structures. 
Table 1: Design of Experiments
Four runs, one run for each of the combinations (designs) 
above, were conducted, comprising a total of 68 agents (17 
agents per run) and 2 organizational configuration files. We 
first created a spreadsheet that listed the 68 agents with their 
settings for the 7 agent parameters, keeping the other 47 agent 
parameters fixed. We then created a script (in the computer 
language R) to generate the 68 agent files, combined that with 
the organizational files and other supporting files for an 
abELICIT run, and submitted the runs to the ELICIT server. 
After the runs were completed, we downloaded the ELICIT 
log files and post-processed them to extract the data.
Results and Analysis
Unfortunately, and perhaps not surprisingly given our crude 
settings, the results obtained were not within valid ranges. 
For example, organizational effectiveness could not be 
determined since agents didn’t provided identifies.  TYPE-2 
agents did an enormous number of shares (a total of 13328 - 
we assumed it was a consequence of setting the 
‘propensityToShare’ parameters) and no pull actions. The 
fact that TYPE-1 agents in the hierarchy didn’t perform post 
actions is also a matter that needs investigating. Agents also 
displayed a consistent and highly symmetrical behavior 
(e.g., same number of shares sent and received). 
The lack of validity for this data set was likely due to the 
team’s inexperience with abELICIT, the specific selection of 
agent parameters to vary and their  ranges, and the setting of 
the other, fixed agent parameters. However, our main goal for 
this workshop was one of understanding the data farming 
mechanics for abELICIT and not a  focus on any particular 
results, and we believe we succeeded in that goal.  It is clear, 
though, that it is crucial in future work to determine adequate 
ranges of agents’ parameters and their interaction with other 
agent characteristics (Figure 1) so that runs yield valid results. 
Nonetheless, a deeper look into these particular results and 
why the results were outside seemingly valid ranges might 
prove useful. 
Nevertheless, to further explore the data and the types of 
analyses that could be obtained, we looked at three 
sociograms that provide a visualization of the social-
networks generated by these illustrative experiments: 
Traditional Hierarchy with TYPE-1 agents (Figure 2), EDGE 
with TYPE-2 agents (Figure 3) and EDGE with TYPE-1 agents 
(Figure 4). These and other tools, applied to data from 
experiments across a wider range of allowable configurations, 
could provide great insight into which of the agents’ 
parameters, and their  interactions, have the most effect on 
outcome metrics. [Note: post-processing of the data and the 
construction of these graphs were graciously made by Marco 
Manso and the set of tools he previously developed to 
examine ELICIT output (Manso and B. Manso, 2010) and 
(Manso and M. Manso, 2010).]
In the figures below, the yellow nodes are the websites 
(WHO, WHAT, WHEN and WHERE), and the other colored 
nodes are the agents (different colors represent the roles in the 
organization, and the node labels reflect notional names for 
the agents). The edges or lines between the nodes represent 
connectivity between the nodes, and the width of the edge 
indicates the amount of sharing of factoids (with other 
connected agents) or the posting or pushing of factoids (with 
websites).
Figure 2 is a traditional HIERARCHY with TYPE-1 agents 
(the H-1 setting described above). The red colored nodes are 
team members, the purple colored nodes are team leaders, 
and the aqua colored node is the Cross-team coordinator. 
Team member, Team leader, and Cross-team coordinator are 
specific agent roles in ELICIT and abELICIT. In this case, there 
are some links that are missing, e.g., there should be links 
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connecting Sam-WHERE and Sidney-WHERE, and similarly 
for the WHEN node. There also appears to be more 
connections between agents than we might expect for the 
HIERARCHY organization. This type of visualization is 
beneficial for easily discovering these types of anomalies. 
On the other hand, trying to make sense of the 
connections in Figure 3 would be challenging. In this case, 
corresponding to E-1 setting above, all agents are linked to all 
websites and each other, illustrating a fully connected 
network. 
Finally, in Figure 4, we have a hybrid structure, 
corresponding to the E-2 setting above, which uses an EDGE 
organizational structure with HIERARCHICAL agent 
behaviors. Again, more work would need to be done in order 
to determine the implications of these differing structures and 
to explain these particular outcomes. 
Figure 2: Traditional Hierarchy with TYPE-1 agents
Figure 3: EDGE with TYPE-2 agents 
Figure 4: EDGE with TYPE-1 agents
SUMMARY
During IDFW 21, the abELICIT team (Team 3) learned more 
about the ELICIT platform and the agent-based functionality 
in abELICIT. Starting with an overall introduction of ELICIT 
and abELICIT, the team then proceeded to prioritize the 54 
agent configuration parameters, ranking the parameters 
based on their expected influence on several outcome 
measures. We discussed a first data farming experiment 
using a 22 full-factorial design (4 runs), comparing a classic 
C2 hierarchy and an edge organization, and hybrids of those. 
This experiment was used to illustrate the data farming 
process and as a means to become familiar with the 
mechanics of making an abELICIT batch run. We then 
constructed 68 agent configuration files (17 agents * 4  runs) 
and an agent batch file and submitted those runs through the 
ELICIT server. We downloaded the data and began the 
analysis of that data by workshop end.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, on behalf of the Bundeswehr, the 
Bundeswehr Procurement Office, and the Bundeswehr 
Centre for Transformation, Cassidian (formerly EADS) has 
been working on the development of two agent-based 
simulation models: First, the model PAX, that concentrates 
on studying peace support operations and focuses on 
analyzing aggression emergence within civilian groups. 
Secondly, the model ABSEM, which is an agent-based model 
that concentrates on modeling complex technical systems 
with a  detailed physical approach and thus allowing to 
analyze the combination of various sensor and effector 
systems in NCO. 
At IDFW 21, the main focus was to analyze sensor 
systems and different tactics, techniques and procedures 
(TTP) in NCO. 
One military scenario was modeled, which focused on 
questions in the context of convoy protection. Different 
realistic asymmetric threat situations were simulated and 
different action alternatives with variable TTPs were analyzed 
and compared to each other.
Figure 1: TIGER HELICOPTER
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Figure 2: Convoy ambush scenario
Scenario Description
A Convoy consisting of transport trucks and an armored 
infantry platoon moves on a main line of communication. An 
alternative route has been reconnoitered. 2 TIGER 
helicopters are deployed for convoy protection using the 
ground escort technique.
Insurgents (INS) prepared an ambush along the LoC with 
two INS groups hidden on both sides of the road. The INS are 
equipped with sub-machine guns and RPGs. A third INS 
group with pickup trucks is hiding about 3 km away from the 
ambush. This group is also equipped with mortars mounted 
on pickup trucks to support the other INS groups with 
indirect fire.
If the convoy or the helicopters identify the ambush 
situation, the convoy will use the alternative route and avoid 
the ambush.
Data Farming Questions and Parameters
The main analysis question to explore was how the flight 
pattern of the two helicopters would effect the identification 
of INS.
To answer this question simulation parameters of the 
own troops (BLUE) and the INS (RED) were varied. 
It was important to ensure that only input data was 
changed, which was meaningful to the simulation scenario 
and needed to answer the data farming question.
To compare data farming results two measures of 
effectiveness (MoE) were defined:
a. MoE 1: Distance of first convoy vehicle to INS 1 
when on TIGER identifies the first INS
b. MoE 2: Proportion of identified INS by both 
TIGERS at the end of the simulation (convoy 
reaches intersection with the alternative route)
BLUE Farming Parameters Min Max
Difference of TIGER speed to convoy speed (km/h) 20 100
Helicopter height above ground (m) 200 1600
First helicopter distance to convoy (m) 0 6000
Convoy speed (km/h) 20 50
Table 1: BLUE Farming Parameters
RED Farming Parameters Min Max
Number of INS in each group 10 40
INS camouflage level 0 100
Table 2: RED Farming Parameters
Analysis
The team used a two prong approach to farm data:
a. Despite only having 6 input parameters we used an 
NOLH design with 65 unique trials. This design 
was chosen to a high density of data points within 
the design space.
At each design points we ran 100 replications.
b. Use a fully gridded design to compute results for a 
validation data set.
The simulation results were divided into two data sets to 
analyze both MoE’s independently. During the workshop we 
were only able to analyze the data set for MoE 2.
In a first step we checked the input data to make sure that 
we did not make any mistakes in the experiment setup. The 
following figure shows an example for the distribution of 
input data for relative TIGER speed.
Figure 3: Distribution of input data for relative Tiger speed
In the next step we built a regression model based on the 
results of the NOLH design to forecast results and to easily 
show dependencies. We started by using partition trees to 
identify the main contributing factors. Figure 4 shows the 
main factors after 31 splits.
Figure 4: Main contributing factors
Because the INS camouflage level contibuted more , by 
far, than any other factor we computed another decision tree, 
eliminating the influence of INS factors (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Main BLUE contributing factors
From both results we could identify the following factors 
as contributing to our regression model:
a. INS camouflage level
b. Relative TIGER speed
c. TIGER height above ground
d. TIGER distance to convoy
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e. Number of INS
To build the model we used a stepwise regression with 
those factors and only kept terms in the model that improved 
R2. We chose to build a quadratic model with two term 
interactions.
The prediction profiler shows how changes in one of the 
factors, in this case the INS camouflage level, change the 
influence of the other factors.
Figure 6: Prediction profiler for the regression model
We validated the regression model with the validation 
data set and could show that it provides reasonable 
predictions.
RESULTS
We were able to build a regression model, to validate it using 
an independent data set and to show that all factors in the 
model were significant.
The main findings are that our tactics, techniques and 
procedures only make a difference when the insurgents are 
well camouflaged. Otherwise the well advanced TIGER 
sensor can identify them independently from its flight pattern.
For well  camouflaged INS we identified the helicopter 
elevation above ground as the most important factor. A lower 
flight elevation leads to a greater possibility of enemy 
detection. This factor is so important in the model because it 
shows up as a quadratic term and in many tow way 
interactions with other contributing factors.
Further important factors are relative TIGER speed, 
distance of the TIGER to the convoy, and the convoy speed.
CONCLUSIONS
For team 4 this was a very successful workshop since we 
were able to set up a complex scenario in ABSEM and to 
conduct multiple simulation runs on our computer cluster 
using as well NOLH as fully gridded designs. The analysis 
let to the identification of main factors in a convoy protection 
scenario. This allows us to focus future live exercises on 
main TTPs for convoy protection using helicopters.
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Figure 7: Fitting the model Figure 8: Validating the model
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INTRODUCTION
Data farming is a powerful tool for analyzing complex 
problems numerically. Our goal is to apply data farming 
methodology using the SANDIS combat model (see Lappi, 
2008) to effectively study alternative scenarios. In order to do 
that, we introduce a  rather simple scenario where a convoy 
supported by mortar vehicles comes under attack. The data 
farming is realized by collecting data from batch runs in 
which simulations are done with different initial parameters 
of a given battle situation. The results of the differently 
parameterized cases are the losses caused during the 
scenario.
Figure 1. The scenario after blue and red have started the firefight. 
Blue circles correspond to the convoy, red  to the attacking force 
and green to civilian groups.
Description of Scenario
This work is continuation for an earlier convoy study 
(Lindberg et al., 2009) which focused on the effects of mortar 
support for convoys.  Here we examine the sensitivity of the 
results to certain parameters. Also, we add civil parts to the 
scenario and modify the convoy, equipment and attacking 
force. The scenario consists of an attacking red force, a blue 
force convoy with escorting mortar  vehicles, and civilian 
parts. The convoy advances along a narrow road through a 
forest, which makes passing of stopped vehicles difficult. 
The civilians are wandering in the forest and on the roads 
without any reaction to the fighting. The case study begins 
when the convoy is stopped and attacked by the red force. 
The set up is presented in Figure 1 and the personnel, 
vehicles and weapons used are listed in Table 1.
Part Blue Force Red Force Civil Part
Vehicles and 
weapons




carrying 7 men 
per vehicle, and 
one mortar 









2 Truck platoons 
of three trucks 
with two 
personnel.
1 Cell with 6 






All soldiers have 
assault rifles.
All soldiers have 
assault rifles.
5 groups of ten 
unarmed 
persons.
Table 1. A list of personnel, weapons and vehicles of the parties in 
the scenario.
Data farming using SANDIS
Simulations implemented with the SANDIS software are 
calculated in batch runs. Data farming is done by varying 
selected parameters of interesting events, in this case the 
parameters of mortar fire after the convoy has stopped. We 
shall study the effect of the response times of the mortars, 
variations in  hit probability and the amount of ammunition.
The amount of ammunition is given as the number of 
single shots in a minute for a five minute period (for the 1st 
and 2nd platoon) or number of strikes (10 rounds per minute) 
for the 3rd platoon. The variation in accuracy is implemented 
as additional deviation to the deviation already present in the 
artillery model used (see Heininen, 2006 and Saira et al., 2008).  
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The scenario starts when the convoy has stopped, and the 
possible losses due to the stopping of the convoy are not taken 
into account. The next figure presents the workflow of this 
study.
Scenario timeline Event
0 Convoy encounters an obstacle and 
the head of the convoy stops.
1 Red force opens fire to the headand 
middle of the convoy.
2 Blue force infantry opens fire at the 
attacking force
( 3 - 7 ) + r e s p o n s e 
parameter 
Two blue force platoons under attack 
use mortars against ambushing red 
cells using single shots with a varying 
response t ime and amount of 
grenades.
5 Red force uses mortars against the 
2nd blue platoon
6 + r e s p o n s e 
parameter
3rd platoonʼs mortar opens fire at a red 
cell with 10 round strikes.




3rd platoonʼs blue mortars fire at the 
red mortars. Two blue force platoons 
under attack use their mortar vehicles 
against ambushing red cells with 1-4 
single shots per target and a varying 
delay.
Table 2. The basic scenario timelines which will be varied during 
the data farming.
Figure 2. Graphical view of our simulation procedure.
Six independent parameters are considered: the number 
of rounds (10n, n=1,2),  response time (0-4 min), firing and 
accuracy (additional deviation of 8 to 30m) of the 3rd platoon, 
the number of rounds shot (1-4) by the mortar vehicles of the 
1st and 2nd blue platoons at a selected target at a given time, 
response time (0-2  min) and accuracy (additional deviation of 
2 to 4 meters) of the vehicles of the 1st and 2nd blue platoons .
Two sets of 251 simulations were run, followed by a set of 
128 runs in the neighborhood of the best results. In the first set 
of runs the number of rounds fired at each located target was 
1 or 2, and in the second set 3 or 4. In addition, the accuracy 
modifiers were multiplied by 1.5 for the second set of runs. 
The third set was a further study of parameters around the 
three most suitable parameter vectors given in table 3.
Number of 10 rounds strikes by 3rd platoon 2 2 1
Response time parameter of 3rd  platoon 0 0 1
Variation of accuracy of 3rd  platoon 26,3 8,2 29,3
Number of grenades per close support target of 1st  
and 2nd platoon
3 3 3
Response time parameter of 1st an 2nd platoon 1 1 1
Variation of accuracy of 1st   and 2nd   platoon 4,0 3,1 2,5
Table 3. Parameters which resulted in the least losses for blue and 
civilian parts in the first and second simulation sets.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In total 632 different simulations were run. In order to 
find the most interesting parameters, we began our analysis 
by looking at the losses of blue and civilian parts in the first 
two sets of runs, where the essential difference appeared to be 
the amount of grenades shot by the vehicles in the 1st and 2nd 
platoon. These losses are shown as a scatter plot in Figure 3.
The results of the two initial sets show that using more 
rounds yield better results even with lesser accuracy. To find 
parameters that gave even better results, a set of 128 
simulations was run using parameters in the neighborhood of 
the best results in the initial sets, i.e. those in the lower left 
corner in Figure 3. The results of the third set are shown in 
Figure 4.  
Figure 3. Scatter plot of the blue losses versus civilian losses. 
Markings with a + correspond to the first setup, where the number 
of rounds is either 1 or 2, and markings with a o correspond to 
setups where 3 or 4 rounds were used  In the second set the 
variation of accuracy was also bigger.
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Figure 4. Scatter plot of the blue losses versus civilian losses of 
simulations made around the best parameters found in first runs. 
Figure 5. Screenshot taken from a scenario variation where the 3rd 
platoon’s mortar fires (blue line pointing at the red and green 
circles in the picture) and hits the civilians. 
In the scenario, one group of civilians ventured close to a 
red unit at the eleventh minute of scenario time, which 
resulted in the most civilian casualties, see Figure 5.
Finally, we examined correlations between the studied 
parameters and blue losses. The biggest correlations are 
presented in Figure 6.
There is no strong correlation between the losses and any 
single studied parameter. However, we observed from the 
best parameter combinations that a short response time for the 
3rd platoon, combined with shooting three rounds with the 
1st and 2nd platoons gave optimal results. The extreme 
points, i.e. the variations with least or most losses, are 
explained only by a rather complicated combination of 
parameters, leaving open questions for further study.
Figure 6. The parameters with the greatest correlation with blue 
losses. Parameters in the figure are: Number of 10 round strikes by 
the 3rd platoon (1), Response time parameter of the 3rd platoon 
(2), Variation of accuracy of the 3rd platoon (3), Number of rounds 
per close support target of the 1st and 2nd platoons (4), Response 
parameter of the 1st an 2nd platoons (5) and Variation of accuracy 
of the 1st and 2nd platoons (6).
CONCLUSIONS
Convoy security was studied and a data farming experiment 
with SANDIS software was performed. The considered case 
study shows us that data farming can be done using 
SANDIS, as long as the operator takes care that the 
parameters stay realistic in terms of a given scenario. It can 
be said that advanced mortar vehicles gave convoy a useful 
indirect fire capability. No red teaming was done in this case, 
so the optimal parameters apply only to the given scenario, 
in which the fast response time and reasonable spreading of 
the rounds to the target area seemed to be the essential 
parameters. Obtained results support further data farming 
studies with SANDIS in different topics with bigger 
scenarios and parameter sets.
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Team 6 is undertaking an ongoing study and effort to 
integrate Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques into 
data farming processes and analysis. Our initial context for 
this activity has been insurgent warfare and Counter-
Improvised Explosive Devise (C-IED) efforts. We continue to 
explore methods of extracting, analyzing, and visualizing 
dynamic social networks that are inherent in agent-based 
models in order to build tools to examine and better 
understand insurgencies. We have begun our effort with the 
emergence and evolution of cliques and are examining the 
types of network statistics that can be used as MOE and 
pointers to unique and emergent behaviors of interest.
Background
During IDFW 19 Team 6 demonstrated the ability to identify, 
extract, and visualize emergent complex networks from 
relatively simple agent-based scenarios. In IDFW 20 we 
began examining the usage of  SNA statistics extracted from 
the emergent networks in illustrative scenarios as a basis for 
data farming. These statistics were explored in detail  to 
determine which MOEs would be most beneficial for 
analyzing the types of networks produced by our agent 
based model. At the conclusion of IDFW 20 it was concluded 
that Team 6 would focus on specific counter-insurgency 
(COIN) questions in subsequent efforts to provide context 
for further development of capabilities. 
Within insurgent, IED-using networks there are two of 
interest:  IED Emplacement Networks (consisting of personnel 
that is directly involved with IED usage) and IED Enabling 
Networks (consisting of communities that indirectly support 
the IED Emplacement networks).  Team 6 indicated that they 
were interested in focusing on questions focused on the latter.
IDFW 21 Goals
Team 6 had several high-level goals for IDFW 21:
• Continued improvement and expansion of SNA Data 
Farming capabilities;
• Analysis of CliqueCreator Data Farming Runs—The 
CliqueCreator scenario is a simple agent-based model 
that produces evolving cliques; and
• Begin defining a focus question and building an 
illustrative model to provide COIN/C-IED context for 
the ongoing study of SNA data farming capabilities.
The CliqueCreator  scenario provided the initial context 
for the weeks continued capability development efforts. 
CliqueCreator, developed using the Pythagoras modeling 
environment, uses agent interactions to affect agent 
“Persona” attributes. Agent interaction results in agents 
becoming more similar in “Persona.”  Agents tend to move 
toward similar agents and away from dissimilar. As “cliques” 
emerge and evolve, their movement may result in 
interactions with other cliques, resulting in “theft” of 
members and large scale movement in “Persona” attributes. 
Figure 1 shows “snap-shots” from three different views of 
this model using different attributes and methods to show 
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A - Persona Space Step 0 B - Persona Space Step 170 C - Network View Step 170 D - Spatial View Step 115
Figure 1 - CliqueCreator Scenario - Three Views
changes in agents and their relationships. Figure 1A and B 
show the movement of agents in the color-based “Persona”-
space. Figure 1C shows a traditional network view of the 
agents in a homophilic sense using the Persona. Figure 1D 
shows the more traditional spatial view with interaction 
shown with lines. 
An illustrative set of data farming runs was executed 
and Team 6 began analysis to address the following questions: 
• “How important is the exact layout and specific agent 
attributes of the initial population to the statistical 
outcomes of the scenario?” 
• Do specific agents consistently establish the same 
network roles?
• Are specific groups of agents “destined” to be in the 
same cliques?
Table 1 provides the specific variations that were made to 
scenario parameters. Not shown in the table is that this matrix 
was executed for two separate runs: one in which the random 
seed that established the initial population and layout was 
allowed to vary for each run, and another where the same 
random seed was used for  all runs. In both cases, the 
populations had the same statistical makeup, but in the 
former case each starting population was different.
colVul - Color Vulnerability (Level of effect of “chat” for agent)
colVulTol - Color Vulnerability Tolerance (Variability of colVul)
relativeChg - Percentage relative change of color when “chatted”
influenceRng - Maximum distance of interaction (chat)
friendThresh/enemyThresh - Range where agents are “linked”
Table 1 - CliqueCreator Data Farming Design Matrix
Figures 2 and 3 are a comparative analysis plots using the 
JMP software that represent  the difference of these two cases 
across a set of the design parameters. Initial examination 
indicated significant difference in variability, but more 
analysis is required.
Focus Question: Village Scenario
Figure 4 represents the set of networks, hierarchies and 
relationships that are the target make up of an “Afghan 
Village” scenario. The purpose of this scenario is to provide 
and illustrative forum to begin to address the following 
questions:
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Figure 2: Different Starting Populations (Random Seed)
Figure 3: Same Starting Populations (Fixed Seed)
Figure 4 - Evolvable Networks and Relationships for Village Scenario
• What actions should blue take to eliminate the 
employment of IEDs?
• Are social networks important factors in the tendency for 
individuals to employ IEDs?
• Given the importance of social networks what actions 
blue should take in order to eliminate their effectiveness 
in terms of IED employment? Figure 5 offers “Law 




actions to be 
tested.
Part of the focus 





SNA metrics that 
will assist in the 
evaluation blue 
actions.
An existing Afghani village, Kace Satar, was examined and 
will be used as a  basis for scenario development. This village 
is at the intersection of the Helmand, Farah, and Nimroz 
provinces in Southern Afghanistan. The population within a 
7 km range is about 298. The specific distribution of 
population classes is currently uncertain, but discussion with 
subject-matter experts (SMEs) indicates that the social 
interactions and hierarchies shown in Figure 4 are of 
significance and have real impact on potential recruitment. 
These networks include:
Village Family Leadership and hierarchy – Although the 
family leadership and relationships are primary, they can be 
subordinate to broader and external Tribal leadership. These 
“command” structures can be hierarchical or matrix... but 
can also be considered somewhat stable. Removal of some 
central  figures can cause significant change to the overall 
network structure.
Taliban – The insurgents can be completely independent of 
the other hierarchies and maybe working in opposition to 
tribal and family goals.
District – The Karzai leadership and judicial structure is also 
independent of the tribal and family structure and also may 
be in opposition to tribal intent.
Young males (recruitment age) - Some research has 
indicated that there are specific personality attributes that 
can affect the likeliness of recruitment into insurgent 
behaviors. We will consider  using these as potential 
“Persona” attributes for young male villagers. Some of these 
attributes include: Status (degree of recognition desired); 
Thrill  (desire for adventure); Revenge (outlet for frustration); 
Identity (need for belonging); and Money (Survival).
Village Women/Village Men - Women have influence in 
Afghani society. This influence is not generally exercised in 
public, however, but through interaction with family.
Scenario Status
Team 6 focused on developed an initial representation of the 
day-to-day periodic relationships of men, women, and 
families in the Afghan Village. We have built a six family 
(180 agents) scenario that establishes a “daily” period of 
home to work (100 time steps per cycle;  8 “days”), where 
work is segregated by sex. Each family is represented by an 
attribute range and “FamilyTalk” and “WorkTalk” can 
change a “persona” attribute relative to color of two agents 
interacting. Figure 6 shows provides snapshots of this effort.
Accomplishments and Way Ahead
The initial data farming and results examined pertaining to 
the importance of specific initial populations demonstrated 
differences in variability, but was not 
conclusive and led to a set of 
interesting questions that need to be 
examined.
The initial implementation of the 
village families with family and 
independent male and female 
interaction has been accomplished, but 
Team 6 believes that even this basic 
interaction should be data farmed and 
analyzed before proceeding to a more 
complex scenario with interacting 
networks. 
So far, Team 6 has  developed tools 
that focus on homiphily networks 
based on Pythagoras color. EWe intend 
to expand data farming methods for 
other network layers to include 
interactions (chat, weapon, attribute 
change, etc) and spatial (proximity 
networks).
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A B
Figure 6 -Pythagoras Village Scenario’s Two Modes for Family Agents. Figure 1A represents 
“Family Time” when households gather as families such as for evening meals. Figure 1B, “Work 
Time,” represents the daily period in which villagers congregate, predominately by sex, to 
undertake work chores.
Figure 5 - Question: What actions should 
blue take to eliminate insurgent recruitment 
and the enabling of IED emplacement?
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INTRODUCTION
Team 7 developed an Agent Based Model in NetLogo 4.1 
to study the impacts of the placement and size of resource 
dispensaries and processing centers on the successfulness of a 
Humanitarian Relief Mission. The model tracks the number 
of people in need of resources, time to receive resources, 
crime incidents, and population migration. The model 
incorporates social attributes, ethnicity, and people’s resource 
desires.
MotIvation
As evidenced by the humanitarian disasters in Africa, 
Haiti, Pakistan, and Turkey, humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HA/DR) missions continue to be in major 
demand. As evidenced by the examples presented above, 
these oftentimes lead to sociopolitical instability, and in some 
extreme cases, war and genocide.[9] It is well understood that 
a country’s situation can quickly deteriorate when struck by a 
natural disaster of a sufficiently large magnitude. What is 
more difficult to prove, but has in fact happened on a number 
of occasions, is that humanitarian assistance missions 
produce unexpected effects that could have been avoided if 
the missions would have been planned differently. Somalia in 
1990, Rwanda in 1993, East Timor in 1998, New Orleans in 
2005, and Haiti in 2010 are all cases where the humanitarian 
assistance was either insufficient, lacked a comprehensive 
spectrum of operations, and eventually fueled blowbacks1.
The majority of the work in this field focuses on 
optimizing the logistics to bring maximum amount of 
resources in the minimum amount of time to the region in 
question. This, however, is not always sufficient. In the 
aftermath of the 7.0 Richter Scale magnitude earthquake that 
struck Haiti  in 2010 there were many accounts of looting, gun-
fights, and riots due to the lack of security enforcement and 
resource shortages.[1,2] It is not enough to just get relief to the 
region it must also be distributed throughout the population 
in a safe and secure manner. The most common approach is 
to setup centers in order to provide the population with the 
required resources and services. The questions we ask are 
how should these centers be set up to best meet the needs of 
the people?  Should there be fewer centers with greater 
capacity or should there be more low capacity centers? 
Should the centers’ locations account for  the characteristics of 
the population, e.g., can resource distribution incite ethnic 
violence? How does the total daily operation time affect the 
distribution of resources and services? And finally, how do 
these produce different levels of insecurity and population 
migration?  In order to study these effects, Team 7 developed 
an agent-based model that attempts to capture the most 
pertinent elements of the problem.
Modeling
In order to develop the proper model of a HA/DR 
mission, one must consider the following aspects of the 
community in distress: population density, ethnic makeup 
and tensions, social attributes, resources availability and 
desire, crime rates, and the location and makeup of processing 
and dispensary centers. The model was developed in 
NetLogo 4.1, a free agent-based modeling and system 
dynamics modeling framework developed by The Center for 
Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling at 
Northwestern University.[10]
Population Density
Modeling every individual in the population as an agent 
would be infeasible from a computational standpoint, so a 
method for simplifying the pertinent characteristics of the 
population had to be devised. To confront this issue a 
combination of Cellular Automata and Agent Based Models 
were used. The environment that the model operated on was 
split up into 32x32 patches. These patches represented a 
geographical area of a given physical dimension represented 
in meters. Each patch contained information on the number 
of individuals living in this area in addition other information 
discussed in the following sections. The total number of 
people in the model is predefined and then is random 
distributed throughout the map. The model can be easily 
modified to have higher resolution—i.e., higher discretization
—of the environment.
Ethnic Considerations
Not all  HA/DR scenarios have a major focus on ethnic 
conflict. On the other hand, some HA/DR missions are a 
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1 Blowback is a term used to refer to situations where unexpected and undesirable consequences occur from seemingly benign 
actions
direct result of, or can be affected by, ethnic tensions. For this 
reason the ethnic makeup and corresponding tensions of a 
region must be considered in order to study how conflict 
arises. Of particular interest to this study is: how does the 
placement and distribution of the centers impact ethnic 
tension?
A simple example of how resource placement can induce 
violence can be explained by Figure 1. Let’s assume we have 
two ethnic groups (A and B).  In addition assume these two 
groups have a history of violence , then by the placement of a 
resource center (denoted as a blue star) can lead to increased 
violence by forcing ethnic group A to travel through a region 
dominated by group B.
The model includes the ethnic group breakdown by 
percentage for each patch. In addition the model includes an 
inter-relationship matrix that determines how well the 
different ethnic groups interact. This will have an important 
impact when studying the crime.
Figure 1: Example of violence induced by resource placement
Social Attributes
Social attributes help to better define the makeup of the 
population. This data is stored in the patch. Some examples 
of these attributes are: poverty rates, education rates, and 
employment. These metrics will play a major role in 
calculating crime. The social attribute data can be attained 
from census data.
Resource Availability vs. Desire
Every patch will contain information on the amount of 
resources that exist on that patch. Examples of this could be 
liters of water and calories of food. The patch will consume 
the resources at a specified rate. This will continue to change 
until the patch reaches the desire threshold. Every patch has 
a slightly different desire. If the patch reaches the desire 
threshold then those on the patch deem their state of 
resources to be insufficient and will create a gathering agent. 
This gathering agent will consist of a percentage of the 
people on the patch. The percentage is predetermined. This 
gathering agent will then travel to the nearest resource 
dispensary to acquire the desired resources and bring it back 
to its home patch. 
Processing and Dispensing Centers
An important distinction needs to be made between a 
processing center and a dispensing center. A processing 
center is a center that the people visit to have some service 
done for them or to them. There is nothing physical that the 
people leave the center with. The people must report here to 
receive what is needed. Examples of this include hospitals or 
vaccination clinics. The demand for processing is created 
randomly in the model. In contrast, a dispensing center is 
one that gives the people a material good that can be carried 
back to their home. The people could either report to the 
center personally to receive the good or have someone 
retrieve the good for them. Examples of this are food, water, 
and tents.
Every center has a maximum throughput capacity and a 
limited supply. The throughput capacity is determined by the 
number of people that can be processed at once and the time it 
takes to process an individual. The throughput capacity of the 
resource and processing centers can, and probably will, differ 
greatly. For example, more time is required to treat medical 
needs than to hand out food. In addition, medical experts are 
in shorter supply than people who can hand out food. The 
agent will  arrive at the center and get into a line. They will 
wait until  they are processed, the center runs out of resources, 
or the center closes. Once this occurs the agent returns home. 
Crime
Crime is an important and complicated aspect of this model. 
As referenced earlier, crime ran rampant in a wide variety of 
HA/DR missions, especially in Haiti after the 2010 
earthquake. This was a result of insufficient security forces 
and lack of vital resources. Understanding how the 
placement of centers impacts the crime of the affected area is 
essential  to produce a  comprehensive and satisfactory plan 
for HA/DR missions.
The occurrence of crime is a result of a vast number of 
different factors.[3] These factors range from socioeconomic 
status and education to criminal punishment and reinforcing 
nature of crime.[3,4,5,6,7] In addition, crime rates and the 
sources of crime vary across different societies.[3]  For a 
measure of impact on crime rates the reader is referred to 
references 3 through 7.
Due to the wide range of factors contributing to crime 
and the varying impacts across different societies an 
expandable and adaptable crime model was developed. This 
model is composed of two phases. The first phase is the 
probability of a patch to create a  crime agent. The second 
phase takes place when the crime agent travels in a random 
walk until it commits a crime. A crime agent will commit a 
crime based on a separate probability, based on the 
characteristics of that agent and the patch where that agent 
currently is. The probability of a patch to create a crime agent 
is presented in Equation 1. The probability of a crime agent to 
commit a crime is presented in Equation 2.
Equation 1 is composed of six elements. The first is the 
dominating coefficient multiplying the whole equation, DN. 
This coefficient allows the probably to distinguish between 
day and night. The second part is a summation of the impact 
of social attributes on crime with their corresponding 
weightings. The third part is a measure of the desire level of 
the patch. If the people are without critical resources they are 
more likely to engage in criminal acts out of desperation. The 
fourth is a measure of an ethnic group’s tendency towards 
crime. The hypothesis is that one ethnic group may be 
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quicker to resort to crime than another. This ethnic 
consideration may not always be present and can be zeroed if 
deemed irrelevant. The fifth part is the factor that describes 
the reinforcing nature of crime.[4,5] The sixth, and final part 
is a measure of the impact on the presence of security forces.
Equation 1
Equation 2 is the probability a crime agent will commit a 
crime, and it is similar in form to Equation 1. The first 
significant change is the second summation term. This is a 
measure of the crime agents’ desire for resources and the 
potential victims’ desire for resources. The potential victim is 
the current patch that the crime agent is on. The next 
difference is in the next term. Here the ethnicity of the crime 
agent and the potential victim plays a role. Depending on the 
ethnic relationship this could increase or decrease the 
probability of a crime being committed. The final difference is 




The final element to be modeled is migration. The 
premise of this portion of the model is that if people are 
suffering—e.g., due to crime, lack of resources or services, 
ethnic tensions—and there are areas with better conditions, or 
a promise for better conditions, they are likely to leave and 
move to the more promising area.
Equation 3 describes the elements that compose the 
calculation that determines the goodness of a given patch, 
Pgood. The a, b, c and d terms are multipliers for each of the 
terms. The term rp is a relaxation constant, if it is zero the 
goodness of the patches does not change from one time step 
to the next, if it is set to one, it will have no memory of the 
goodness from the prior step. The first term is the summation 
over the m Social Attributes of patch, e.g., education, 
employment, etc. The parameters CT, CGM and CM, are the 
counters for the number of crimes committed by crime agents 
from other patches on the patch, how many successful crimes 
crime agents from that patch have conducted in other patches, 
and the number of gatherers that have been mugged on that 
patch respectively. The parameter t is time. Pop and 
PopAreaRatio are the number of people residing on that patch 
and the ratio between total area and total population 
respectively. This term helps quantify overcrowding in 
relative terms. The final term is a measure of how many 
resources that patch is lacking, where (RD)i is the ith resource 
desired and (RP)i is the amount of that resource present. The 
coefficient ei is a measure of the weighing given to that 
resource by the population on that patch.
Equation 3 
The goodness of all the patches is calculated at every time 
step, and it is compared to a parameter that represents the 
value of the property in that patch. This parameter accounts 
for the fact that if people have a highly valuable property, they 
are more likely to remain there rather than if they have no 
material reason to stay.
Once a group of people in a patch decides to migrate, 
they look for a patch that is at least a certain amount better 
than their patch and has their ethnicity. Then a migration 
agent is created and that agent traverses to the new location.
ANALYSIS
Once the model was created, a Design of Experiments (DOE) 
could be executed to determine how the centers should be 
set up to best meet the need of the people. The first step of 
this process is to define the control variables of the model 
and the subsequent ranges.
Design Ranges
Design ranges for the center control variables can be 
developed from the operations used by the US Army Corps 
of Engineers (USACE).[8] USACE uses three different types 
of resource centers. They operate by loading resources into 
cars that pass through 4, 2, and 1 lanes of cars, respectively. 
This case is amenable to a domestic HA/DR operation, e.g., 
Hurricane Katrina. They make the assumption that each lane 
can process 5,000 people every 12 hours. Each car is assumed 
to represent 3 people and is given 1 day of supplies for each 
person. The centers operate for a total of 12 hours a day. 
With this information in addition to basic approximations, 
design ranges for the 10 input variables were defined and are 
shown in Table 1.







Center Operation Time 8 Hr 18 Hr
Resource Limit 2,000 ppl 20,000 ppl
Dispensary Lines 1 6
Time to Dispense 20 sec 30 sec
Number Resource 
Centers 1 20
Supplies Dispensed 1 Day 10 Days
Number Process Centers 1 8
Processing Lines 2 10
Time to Process 5 minutes 60 minutes
Table 1: DOE Variable Ranges
Design of Experiments
The DOE selected for the analysis of the model utilized a 128 
case Nested Latin Hypercube Design (NLHD) developed by 
Prof. Peter Qian from the University of Wisconsin plus three 
different variations of a 20 case Robust Screening Design 
(RSD). These 20 cases were scaled to span 50%, 75% and 
100% of the design space, for a total of 60 cases. Each of the 
188 cases was executed 20 times to obtain statistical 
significance.
The 128 NLHD cases allow the designer to run 
increasingly larger blocks which remain orthogonal, i.e., the 
first block has 16 cases which are orthogonal, and when the 
additional blocks of 16, 32, and 64 cases are included, the 
correlation of the aggregated design remains at a minimum 
value. This allowed the team to obtain results at the 
workshop, whereas it would not have been possible from a 
computational standpoint to execute the 128 cases with their 
20 repetitions during the workshop. Including the RSD and 
NLHD cases and their 20 repetitions, Team 7 executed a total 
of 3,760 cases.
The RSD cases are used to validate the goodness of the 
regressions based on the NLHD cases. The sequentially 
increasing span of the RSD allows for the testing of how well 
the model interpolates and extrapolates to the corners of the 
design space. The authors extend their thanks to Tom 
Donnelly from JMP for providing the knowledge and the 
designs.
Results
The data collected from the model included resource needs, 
processing needs, crime rates, and migration at 6 points over 
three days (every 12 hours of simulation). The data was 
analyzed using JMP. The analysis shed light onto the 
question of how the centers should be set up. It was found 
that the number of centers was a more critical factor than 
their number of lines. This tells us that during HA/DR 
missions it is better to set up several small centers with low 
capacity throughout a region as opposed to few large centers 
with high capacity. This result is in agreement to what is to 
be expected, since the economies of scale of having fewer 
larger centers and their increased logistic efficiency cannot 
be currently computed by the model. Total time of operation 
of the centers did have an impact, however it did not have 
nearly as large an impact as the number of centers or total 
capacity did.
Future Work
Future work will focus on improving the behavior of the 
agents and the models for crime and migration. In addition, 
the team plans to develop a more intelligent method for 
placing the centers, allowing greater granularity in the study 
of the planning of HA/DR missions.
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The U.S. Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force 
(MPF) enables the rapid deployment of Marine forces to 
permissive areas of operations. The MPF consists of more then 
a dozen ships divided between three squadrons. Each 
squadron supports a  notional Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) and is based in one of three locations: the Pacific 
Ocean, the Indian Ocean, or the Mediterranean. 
MPF Operation
During an MPF operation, a Maritime Prepositioning Ship 
Squadron (MPSRON) or some portion or combination 
thereof, is deployed to a permissive area of operations where 
its equipment and supplies are offloaded. A fly-in echelon 
(FIE) compromising the bulk of personnel and additional 
equipment is flown into a nearby airport. The equipment 
and personnel are then integrated to form a  functioning 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). This process is 
called Arrival and Assembly.
Motivation
The MPF concept of operations has historically been focused 
on the employment of a MEB. The equipment that a MEB 
requires (its table of equipment (TE)) exceeds the equipment 
that a  MPSRON can provide. Therefore, a MPSRON's entire 
set of equipment is allocated to a MEB with the remainder of 
the MEB's TE being designated for the FIE. This operation 
employment concept results in ships being densely packed 
to maximize the amount of equipment that can be 
prepositioned, reducing the FIE. 
Embark constraints to some degree determine how the 
prepositioning objective (portion of the MEB TE that is 
prepositioned on a MPSRON) is distributed across the ships 
in a MPSRON and where within a ship the items are placed. 
For example, tanks are spread across the ships due to weight 
and some items are placed in specific holds or decks due to 
height restrictions. With one exception, equipment is generally 
loaded by these constraints with little regard for operational 
employment since the entire set of equipment is needed to 
support the MEB and equipment is only designated down to 
the MAGTF element level (Command Element (CE), Ground 
Combat Element (GCE), Air Combat Element (ACE), and 
Logistics Combat Element (LCE)).
A subset of each MPSRON's equipment is designated for 
the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The "MEU slice" is 
loaded on two ships and in locations that enable the 
equipment to be offloaded with out having to offload much 
non-MEU equipment.
The MPF concept of employment may head towards 
supporting less than MEB sized units or capability sets 
(LTMUs). Currently, the equipment to support a LTMU may 
be spread across multiple ships within a squadron and may be 
embarked in inaccessible locations.
Workshop Goals
The goal of this work at IDFW 21 is to use data farming 
techniques and the MPF Arrival and Assembly model to 
explore the trade off between the size of an LTMU 
equipment set, the access of equipment on the MPSRON and 
the number of ships that the equipment is drawn from. 
Access is a combination of two factors; how much 
equipment that is not required must be offloaded to allow 
the offload of the required equipment and the relative 
ordering of the required and not required equipment.
ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY MODEL
The MPF Arrival and Assembly Model is a discrete event 
simulation implemented in ExtendSim7. The model has two 
main processes: the offload of equipment from a ship to a 
pier and the throughput of equipment from the pier to its 
using unit located some distance from the pier.
Offload
The offload process models the interaction between ships 
and docks, where a dock is required to conduct an offload. 
Multiple docks allow for the simultaneous offload of ships. 
There are two methods for offloading equipment from a 
ship: 
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1. Roll  On Roll Off (RORO) is used for vehicles that 
can be driven off the ship via its stern ramp. RORO 
requires both a ramp (ship asset) and offload 
drivers.
2. Lift On Lift Off (LOLO) is used for offloading 
containers (and possible vehicles) by lifting them 
with either a ship crane (ship asset) or a gantry 
crane (dock asset).
Equipment is offloaded in a random order.
Throughput
The throughput process models the physical movement of 
equipment from the pier  to the using unit and any 
maintenance or setup actions that must be completed to 
make equipment operational. The equipment is classified 
into four types; ammo containers (AMMO), non-ammo 
containers (ISO), vehicles that require a heavy equipment 
transporter (HET), and vehicles that can move themselves 
(RS).
Scenario
In this scenario, the throughput parameters are fixed. The 
quantity of equipment (both required and not required), the 
offload ordering, the number of ships, and the number of 
docks are explored using a full factorial design.
Metrics
Figure 1 is a screen shot of the model outputs. The blue, 
green and red lines represent the counts of equipment over 
time at the pier, at the final destination, and in the 
throughput process respectively. We use days to complete 
throughput of the required equipment as our primary 
metric.
Figure 1. Simulation Output. The blue line identifies the count of 
equipment as it is offloaded at the pier. The green line is the count 
of equipment as it arrives at the final destination. The red line is 
the count of equipment in the throughput process.
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
The equipment on the MPSRON is partitioned into three 
sets: offloaded required, offloaded not required, and not 
offloaded. The total amount of equipment is always fixed at 
5000. The quantity of offloaded required equipment is a 
factor and varies from 100 to 2500 in increments of 200. The 
quantity of offloaded not required is a proportion of the not 
required equipment. The proportion is a  factor and varies 
from 0.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1.
The number of ships varies from 1 to 4. The amount of 
required and not required equipment is equally distributed 
across the number of ships and the four equipment types in 
the scenario.
The number of docks in the scenario is either 1 or 4 
representing the extremes of one ship offloaded at a time and 
all ships offloaded at the same time.
The offload ordering is determined by assigning each piece 
of offloaded equipment a random number between 0 and 1. 
The distribution that this number is drawn from varies for 
the required and not required equipment as depicted in 
Figure 2.
Figure 2. Offload ordering distributions. Each equipment item is 
assigned an ordering priority drawn from a random variable. The 
distributions used determine the relative access of the required 
equipment. 
RESULTS
For each level  of required equipment, a linear model with 
the time to throughput all required equipment to its 
destination versus the number of docks, the number of ships, 
the amount of equipment not required and the access 
ordering of the equipment and all two way interactions as 
factors, was fit and the significance of each factor calculated. 
The results are in Table 1. A plot of the effects of the most 
significant factors is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Factor effects.  The amount of equipment not required 
has the largest effect on the response.  However, its magnitude is 
decreasing as the size of the required equipment increases.  The 
other factors have a relatively constant effect on the response.
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The total amount of not required equipment that must be 
offloaded plays a  significant role across all of the levels of 
required items. The number of docks and ships are significant 
in some levels of required items. The relative ordering of 
equipment does not play a significant role in all but one level 
of required items.
The effects plot shows that the not required equipment 
has the largest effect.  However, its effect decreases as the 
amount of required equipment increases. The other factors 
have a relatively constant effect on the response.
Figure 4 is a  plot of the design points where the average 
day to complete the throughput all of the required equipment 
was day five.  The plot is faceted by the total required 
equipment versus the total not required equipment with 
number of ships on the x-axis and access ordering on the y-
axis.  The number of docks is indicated by the color of the 
points.  This plot reveals that having multiple docks enables 
the offload of much more equipment in a  particular time 
frame.  It also reveals that there is little correlation between 
the number of ships and the access order.
Inspection of these plots across the set of days required to 
complete the throughput of required equipment (2 days to 23 
days) shows that the time required is highly dependent upon 
the size of the equipment sets.
The access of LTMU sized equipment sets will  be an 
important consideration in the load planning of the MPF ships 
in the future.  The ships have limited high access locations and 
there are many different LTMUs that could be sourced from a 
MPSRON (e.g., Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, 
Security Cooperation MAGTF, fuel, water or life support 
equipment sets).
Figure 4. Plot of the design points where the mean days to 
complete throughput of the required equipment was on day five.  
The plot is faceted by the total required and not required 
equipment with the number of ships on the x-axis and the access 
ordering on the y-access.  The number of docks is indicated by the 
color of the points.
The next step will be to explore specific scenario offloads. 
This will require the specification of the required equipment 
set and an offload plan derived from the actual load plans to 
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include the deterministic offload order vice a random order 
and the not required equipment set to be offloaded.
SUMMARY AND WAY AHEAD
The access of equipment plays a significant role when 
offloading a LTMU equipment set during an MPF supported 
operation.  The access of the equipment has two components, 
the size of the equipment set that is not required but must be 
offloaded and the relative ordering of the not required and 
required sets.  We found that the size of the not required 
equipment set is the most significant factor and that it has the 
most effect on the time to throughput the required equipment. 
However, this effect decreases as the size of the required set of 
equipment increases.  The two are related because the total 
amount of equipment on a MPSRON is finite and fixed.
The relative ordering of the equipment sets is not 
significant and has a relatively small effect on the time to 
throughput the required equipment. However, the true effect 
may be masked by the choice of metric.  The time to 
throughput all of the required equipment to its final 
destination is tied to the last piece of equipment. The shape of 
the accumulation curve at the final destination (green line in 
Figure 1) is not considered. The majority of equipment could 
arrive relatively quickly while a  few items are delayed at the 
end thus skewing the final time to complete the throughput. 
The impact of this choice of metric must be further explored.
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International Data Farming Workshop 22
When: 20 - 25 March 2011
Where: 	
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
Data farming is a capability that makes use of high performance computing to run models many times. This 
capability gives modelers and analysts an enhanced ability to discover trends and outliers in results, do 
sensitivity studies, verify and validate over extended ranges of input parameters, and consider modeling and 
analyzing non-linear phenomena with characteristics that cannot be precisely defined. The International Data 
Farming Workshops have been a forum for the exploration of important questions for many years. The cores 
of the workshops are teams that are formed around these questions. These multi-disciplinary teams use data 
farming practices including simulations, such as agent based models, rapid model prototyping, high performance 
computing, and data analysis, state-of-the-art design of experiments, parameter space exploration, and 
collaborative environments. The first workshop took place in Maui in 1999 and the workshop coming up in 
Monterey next month is number 22.  We now have 12 teams lined up for IDFW 22 and whether you are a 
newcomer to the workshops or have participated in the past, we welcome you to participate! 
IDFW 22 Tentative Agenda
Sunday, March 20: Optional technical sessions; Opening reception and dinner
Monday, March 22: Opening briefs and team poster sessions in the morning, then begin work in teams
Tuesday - Wednesday, March 23 - 24: Work in teams
Friday, March 26: Outbriefs and Closing Ceremony in the afternoon
More Info : http://harvest.nps.edu
Call for Team Leaders : Please email 
gehorne@nps.edu if you want to lead a team. 
Theme: Enrichment II
International Data Farming Workshop 22
March 20-25, 2011
Monterey, California
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